Abstract-We consider Bandits with Knapsacks (henceforth, BwK), a general model for multi-armed bandits under supply/budget constraints. In particular, a bandit algorithm needs to solve a well-known knapsack problem: find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack. The BwK problem is a common generalization of numerous motivating examples, which range from dynamic pricing to repeated auctions to dynamic ad allocation to network routing and scheduling. While the prior work on BwK focused on the stochastic version, we pioneer the other extreme in which the outcomes can be chosen adversarially. This is a considerably harder problem, compared to both the stochastic version and the "classic" adversarial bandits, in that regret minimization is no longer feasible. Instead, the objective is to minimize the competitive ratio: the ratio of the benchmark reward to algorithm's reward.
I. INTRODUCTION
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bandits is a very active research area spanning computer science, operations research, and economics [30, 22, 46, 25] .
In this paper, we focus on bandit problems which feature supply or budget constraints, as is the case in many realistic applications. For example, a seller who experiments with prices may have a limited inventory, and a website optimizing ad placement may be constrained by the advertisers' budgets. This general problem is called Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK) since, in this model, a bandit algorithm needs effectively to solve a knapsack problem (find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack) or generalization thereof. The BwK model was introduced in [18] as a common generalization of numerous motivating examples, ranging from dynamic pricing to ad allocation to repeated auctions to network routing/scheduling. Various special cases with budget/supply constraints were studied previously, e.g., [23, 16, 17, 79, 35] .
In BwK, the algorithm is endowed with d ≥ 1 limited resources that are consumed by the algorithm. In each round, the algorithm chooses an action (arm) from a fixed set of K actions. The outcome consists of a reward and consumption of each resource; all lie in [0, 1]. The algorithm observes bandit feedback, i.e., only the outcome of the chosen arm. The algorithm stops at time horizon T , or when the total consumption of some resource exceeds its budget. The goal is to maximize the total reward, denoted REW.
For a concrete example, consider dynamic pricing. 1 The algorithm is a seller with limited supply of some product. In each round, a new customer arrives, the algorithm chooses a price, and the customer either buys one item at this price or leaves. A sale at price p implies reward of p and consumption of 1. This example easily extends to d > 1 products/resources. Now the algorithm chooses the per-unit price for each resource, and the customer decides how much of each resource to buy at this price.
Prior work on BwK focused on the stochastic version of the problem, called Stochastic BwK, where the outcome of each action is drawn from a fixed distribution. This problem has been solved optimally using three different techniques [18, 4] , and extended in various directions in subsequent work [4, 19, 6, 5] .
We go beyond the stochastic version, and instead study the most "pessimistic", adversarial version where the rewards and resource consumptions can be arbitrary. We call it adversarial bandits with knapsacks (Adversarial BwK), as it extends the classic model of "adversarial bandits" [12] . Bandits aside, this problem subsumes online packing problems [64, 28] , where algorithm observes full feedback (the outcomes of all possible actions) in each round, and observes it before choosing an action.
Hardness of the problem. Adversarial BwK is a much harder problem compared to Stochastic BwK. The new challenge is that the algorithm needs to decide how much budget to save for the future, without being able to predict it. (It is also the essential challenge in online packing problems, and it drives our lower bounds.) This challenge compounds the ones already present in Stochastic BwK: that exploitation may be severely limited by the resource consumption during exploration, that optimal per-round reward no longer guarantees optimal total reward, and that the best fixed distribution over arms may perform much better than the best fixed arm. Jointly, these challenges amount to the following. An algorithm for Adversarial BwK must compete, during any given time segment [1, τ] , with a distribution over arms that maximizes the total reward on this time segment. However, this distribution may behave very differently, in terms of expected per-round outcomes, compared to the optimal distribution for some other time segment [1, τ ] .
In more concrete terms, let OPT FD be the total expected reward of the best fixed distribution over arms. In Stochastic BwK (as well as in adversarial bandits) an algorithm can achieve sublinear regret: OPT FD − E[REW] = o(T ). 2 In contrast, in Adversarial BwK regret minimization is no longer possible, and we therefore are primarily interested in the competitive ratio OPT FD / E [REW] .
It is instructive to consider a simple example in which the competitive ratio is at least 
). In the second half-time, it offers either reward 1 in all rounds, or reward 0 in all rounds. Thus, there are two problem instances that coincide for the first half-time and differ in the second half-time. The algorithm needs to choose how much budget to invest in the first half-time, without knowing what comes in the second. Any choice leads to competitive ratio at least 5 4 on one of the instances. 2 More specifically, one can achieve regretÕ( √ KT ) for adversarial bandits [12] , as well as for Stochastic BwK if all budgets are Ω(T ) [18] . One can achieve sublinear regret for Stochastic BwK if all budgets are Ω(T α ), α ∈ (0, 1) [18] .
Extending this idea, we prove an even stronger lower bound on the competitive ratio:
Like the simple example above, the lower-bounding construction involves only two arms and only one resource, and forces the algorithm to make a huge commitment without knowing the future.
Algorithmic contributions. Our main result is an algorithm which nearly matches (I.1), achieving
We put forward a new algorithm for BwK, called LagrangeBwK, that unifies the stochastic and adversarial versions. It has a natural game-theoretic interpretation for Stochastic BwK, and admits a simpler analysis compared to the prior work. For Adversarial BwK, we use LagrangeBwK as a subroutine, though with a different parameter and a different analysis, to derive two algorithms: a simple one that achieves (I.2), and a more involved one that achieves the same competitive ratio with high probability. Absent resource consumption, we recover the optimalÕ( √ KT ) regret for adversarial bandits. LagrangeBwK is based on a new perspective on Stochastic BwK. We reframe a standard linear relaxation for Stochastic BwK in a way that gives rise to a repeated zero-sum game, where the two players choose among arms and resources, respectively, and the payoffs are given by the Lagrange function of the linear relaxation. Our algorithm consists of two online learning algorithms playing this repeated game. We analyze LagrangeBwK for Stochastic BwK, building on the tools from regret minimization in stochastic games, and achieve a near-optimal regret bound when the optimal value and the budgets are Ω(T ).
3
Extensions. We obtain several extensions, where we derive improved performance guarantees for some scenarios. These extensions showcase the modularity of LagrangeBwK, in the sense that the two players can be implemented as arbitrary algorithms for adversarial online learning that admit a given regret bound. Each extension follows from the main results, with a different choice of the players' algorithms.
We tackle four well-known scenarios: full feedback [59, 44, 9] , where the algorithm observes the outcomes of all possible actions after each round; combinatorial semi-bandits [50, 55, 11] , where actions are feasible subsets of "atoms" whose individual outcomes are observed and add up to the action's total outcome; contextual bandits [58, 39, 3] , where a context is observed before each round, and the algorithm competes against the best policy in a given policy class; bandit convex optimization [57, 42, 26] , where the rewards are convex functions from arms to reals.
Discussion. LagrangeBwK has numerous favorable properties. As just discussed, it is simple, unifying, modular, and yields strong performance guarantees in multiple settings. It is the first "black-box reduction" from bandits to BwK: we take a bandit algorithm and use it as a subroutine for BwK. This is a very natural algorithm for the stochastic version once the single-shot game is set up; indeed, it is immediate from prior work that the repeated game converges to the optimal distribution over arms. Its regret analysis for Stochastic BwK is extremely clean. Compared to prior work [18, 4] , we side-step the intricate analysis of sensitivity of the linear program to non-uniform stochastic deviations that arise from adaptive exploration.
LagrangeBwK has a primal-dual interpretation, as arms and resources correspond respectively to primal and dual variables in the linear relaxation. Two players in the repeated game can be seen as the respective primal algorithm and dual algorithm. Compared to the rich literature on primaldual algorithms [88, 28, 64] (including the more recent literature on stochastic online packing problems [36, 7, 37, 40, 66] ) LagrangeBwK has a very specific and modular structure dictated by the repeated game.
Logarithmic competitive ratios are common and wellaccepted in the area of approximation algorithms, and particularly in online algorithms (see Related Work for citations).
Benchmarks. We argue that the best fixed distribution over arms is an appropriate benchmark for Adversarial BwK. First, consider the total expected reward of the best dynamic policy, denote it OPT DP . (The best dynamic policy is the best algorithm, in hindsight, that is allowed to switch arms arbitrarily across time-steps.) This is the strongest possible benchmark, but it is too strong for Adversarial BwK. Indeed, we show a simple example with just one resource (with budget B), where competitive ratio against this benchmark is at least T B 2 for any algorithm. Second, consider the total expected reward of the best fixed arm, denote it OPT FA . It is a traditional benchmark in multi-armed bandits, but is uninteresting for Adversarial BwK. We show that the competitive ratio is at least Ω(K) in the worst case, and this is matched, in expectation, by a trivial algorithm that samples one arm at random and sticks with it forever.
For Stochastic BwK, these three benchmarks are related as follows. The best fixed distribution is still the main object of interest, as far as the design and analysis of algorithms is concerned. However, all results -both ours and prior work -are almost automatically extended to compete against the best dynamic policy. The best fixed arm is a much weaker benchmark than the best fixed distribution: there are simple examples when their expected reward differs by a factor of two, in multiple special cases of interest [18] .
Map of the paper. After "related work" and "preliminaries", we present our results in the following order. We develop algorithm LagrangeBwK and analyze it for Stochastic BwK in Section IV. We analyze this algorithm for the adversarial setting in Section V, and derive a simple algorithm that achieves (I.2). We develop the high-probability algorithm in Section VI. Lower bounds are presented in Section VII. Open questions are presented in Section VIII.
The detailed analysis of the high-probability algorithm, the proofs for the lower bounds, and the discussion of the extensions can be found in the full version [53] .
II. RELATED WORK
The literature on regret-minimizing online learning algorithms is vast; see [30, 25, 51] for background. Most relevant are two algorithms for adversarial rewards/costs: Hedge for full feedback [45] , and EXP3 for bandit feedback [12] ; both are based on the weighted majority algorithm from [59] .
Stochastic BwK was introduced and optimally solved in [18] . Subsequent work extended these results to soft supply/budget constraints [4] , a more general notion of rewards 4 [4] , combinatorial semi-bandits [75] , and contextual bandits [19, 6, 5] . Several special cases with budget/supply constraints were studied previously: dynamic pricing [23, 16, 24, 86] , dynamic procurement [17, 79] (a version of dynamic pricing where the algorithm is a buyer rather than a seller), dynamic ad allocation [80, 35] , and a version with a single resource and unlimited time [49, 82, 83, 38] . While all this work is on regret minimization, [47, 48] studied closely related Bayesian formulations.
Stochastic BwK was optimally solved using three different algorithms [18, 4] , with extremely technical and delicate analyses. All three algorithms involve inherently 'stochastic' techniques such as "successive elimination" and "optimism under uncertainty", and do not appear to extend to the adversarial version. One of them, PrimalDualBwK from [18] , is a primal-dual algorithm superficially similar to ours. Indeed, it decouples into two online learning algorithms: a "primal" algorithm which chooses among arms, and a "dual" algorithm similar to ours, which chooses among resources. However, the two algorithms are not playing a repeated game in any meaningful sense, let alone a zerosum game. The primal algorithm operates under a much richer input: it takes the entire outcome vector for the chosen arm, as well as the "dual distribution" -the distribution over resources chosen by the dual algorithm. Further, the primal algorithm is very problem-specific: it interprets the dual distribution as a vector of costs over resources, and chooses arms with largest reward-to-cost ratios, estimated using "optimism under uncertainty".
Our approach to using regret minimization in games can be traced to [43, 45] (see Ch. 6 in [76] ), who showed how a repeated zero-sum game played by two agents yields an approximate Nash equilibrium. This approach has been used as a unifying algorithmic framework for several problems: boosting [43] , linear programs [9] , maximum flow [34] , and convex optimization [1, 85] . While we use a result with the 1/ √ t convergence rate for the equilibrium property, recent literature obtains faster convergence for cumulative payoffs (but not for the equilibrium property) under various assumptions (e.g., [69, 81, 87] ).
Repeated Lagrangian games, in conjunction with regret minimization in games, have been used in a series of recent papers [72, 52, 74, 56, 2, 73] , as an algorithmic tool to solve convex optimization problems; application domains range from differential privacy to algorithmic fairness to learning from revealed preferences. All these papers deal with deterministic games (i.e., same game matrix in all rounds). Reframing the problem in terms of repeated Lagrangian games is a key technical insight in this work. Most related to our paper are [74, 73] , where a repeated Lagrangian game is used as a subroutine (the "inner loop") in an online algorithm; the other papers solve an offline problem. We depart from this prior work in several respects: we use a stochastic game, we deal with some subtleties specific to Stochastic BwK, and we provide a very different analysis for our main results on Adversarial BwK, where we cannot rely on the standard machinery.
Online packing problems (e.g., [29, 37] , see [28] for a survey) can be seen as a special case of Adversarial BwK with a much more permissive feedback model: the algorithm observes full feedback (the outcomes for all actions) before choosing an action. Online packing subsumes various online matching problems, including the AdWords problem [65] motivated by ad allocation (see [64] for a survey). While we derive O(log T ) competitive ratio against OPT FD , online packing admits a similar result against OPT DP .
Another related line of work concerns online convex optimization with constraints [62, 63, 33, 68, 32] . Their setting differs from ours in several important respects. First, the action set is a convex subset of R K (and the algorithms rely on the power to choose arbitrary actions in this set). In particular, there is no immediate way to handle discrete action sets. 5 Second, convexity/concavity is assumed on the rewards and resource consumption. Third, in addition to bandit feedback, full feedback is observed for the resource consumption, and (in all papers except [32] ) one also observes either full feedback on rewards or the rewards gradient around the chosen action. Fourth, their algorithm only needs to satisfy the budget constraints at the time horizon (whereas in BwK the budget constraints hold for all rounds). Fifth, their fixed-distribution benchmark is weaker than ours: essentially, its time-averaged consumption must be small enough at each round t. Due to these differences, their setting admits sublinear regret in the adversarial setting.
Logarithmic competitive ratios are quite common in prior work on approximation algorithms and online algorithms, e.g., in the context of the set cover problem [60, 54] , buyat-bulk network design [14] , sparsest cut [10] , and dial-aride problem [31] , the online k-server problem [20] , online packing/covering problems [15] , online set cover [8] , online network design [84] , and online paging [41] .
Simultaneous work. Two very recent papers came to our attention after the initial publication of this paper on arxiv.org. Rivera et al. [71] consider online convex optimization with knapsacks (essentially, the full-feedback version of our extension to bandit convex optimization). Focusing on the stochastic version, they design an algorithm similar to LagrangeBwK, with a similar regret bound and analysis. They also claim an extension to bandit feedback, without providing any details (such as a precise statement of Lemma III.1 in terms of the regret property (III.2)).
Rangi et al. [70] consider Adversarial BwK in the special case when there is only one constrained resource, including time. They attain sublinear regret, i.e., a regret bound that is sublinear in T . They also assume a known lower bound c min > 0 on realized per-round consumption of each resource, and their regret bound scales as 1/c min . They also achieve polylog(T ) instance-dependent regret for the stochastic version using the same algorithm (matching results from prior work on the stochastic version). BwK with only one constrained resource (including time) is a much easier problem, compared to the general case with multiple resources studied in this paper, in the following sense. First, the single-resource version admits much stronger performance guarantees (polylog(T ) vs. √ T regret bounds for Stochastic BwK, and sublinear regret vs. approximation ratio for Adversarial BwK). Second, the optimal all-knowing time-invariant policy is the best fixed arm, rather than the best fixed distribution over arms.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We use bold fonts to represent vectors and matrices. We use standard notation whereby, for a positive integer K, d+1 , where r t is a reward and c t,i is consumption of each resource i ∈ [d]. Each resource i is endowed with budget B i ≤ T . The game stops early, at some round τ alg < T , when/if the total consumption of any resource exceeds its budget. The algorithm's objective is to maximize its total reward. Without loss of generality all budgets are the same:
The outcome vectors are chosen as follows. In each round t, the adversary chooses the outcome matrix M t ∈ [0, 1] K×(d+1) , where rows correspond to actions. The outcome vector o t is defined as the a t -th row of this matrix, denoted M t (a t ). Only this row is revealed to the algorithm. The adversary is deterministic and oblivious, meaning that the entire sequence M 1 , . . . , M T is chosen before round 1. A problem instance of BwK consists of (known) parameters (d, K, T, B), and the (unknown) sequence M 1 , . . . , M T .
In the stochastic version of BwK, henceforth termed Stochastic BwK, each outcome matrix M t is chosen from some fixed but unknown distribution D BwK over the outcome matrices. A problem instance consists of (known) parameters (d, K, T, B), and the (unknown) distribution D BwK .
Following prior work [18, 4] , we assume, w.l.o.g., that one of the resources is a dummy resource similar to time; formally, each action consumes B/T units of this resource per round (we only need this for Stochastic BwK). Further, we posit that one of the actions is a null action, which lets the algorithm skips a round: it has 0 reward and consumes 0 amount of each resource other than the dummy resource.
Benchmarks. Let REW(ALG) = t∈[τalg] r t be the total reward of algorithm ALG in the BwK problem. Our benchmark is the best fixed distribution, a distribution over actions which maximizes E[REW(·)] for a particular problem instance. The expected total reward of this distribution is denoted OPT FD .
For Stochastic BwK, one can compete with the best dynamic policy: an algorithm that maximizes E[REW(·)] for a particular problem instance. Essentially, this algorithm knows the latent distribution D BwK over outcome matrices. Its expected total reward is denoted OPT DP .
Adversarial online learning. To state the framework of "regret minimization in games" below, we need to introduce the protocol of adversarial online learning, see Figure 1 .
In this protocol, the adversary can use previously chosen arms to choose the payoff vector f t , but not the algorithm's random seed. The distribution f t is chosen as a deterministic function of history. (The history at round t consists, for each round s < t, of the chosen action a s and the observed feedback in this round.) We focus on two feedback models: bandit feedback (no auxiliary feedback) and full feedback (the entire payoff vector f t ). The version for costs can be defined similarly, by setting the payoffs to be the negative of costs.
We are interested in adversarial online learning algorithms 
The benchmark here is the total payoff of the best arm, according to the payoff vectors actually chosen by the adversary. More precisely, we assume high-probability regret bounds of the following form:
for some function R δ (·). We will actually use a stronger version implied by (III.2),
Algorithms EXP3.P [12] for bandit feedback, and Hedge [44] for full feedback, satisfy (III.2) with, resp.,
Regret minimization in games. We build on the framework of regret minimization in games. A zero-sum game (A 1 , A 2 , G) is a game between two players i ∈ {1, 2} with action sets A 1 and A 2 and payoff matrix G ∈ R A1×A2 . If each player i chooses an action a i ∈ A i , the outcome is a number G(a 1 , a 2 ). Player 1 receives this number as reward, and player 2 receives it as cost. A repeated zero-sum game G with action sets A 1 and A 2 , time horizon T and game matrices G 1 , . . . , G T ∈ R A1×A2 is a game between two algorithms, ALG 1 and ALG 2 , which proceeds over T rounds such that each round t is a zero-sum game (A 1 , A 2 , G t ).
The goal of ALG 1 is to maximize the total reward, and the goal of ALG 2 is to minimize the total cost.
The game G is called stochastic if the game matrix G t in each round t is drawn independently from some fixed distribution. For such games, we are interested in the expected game, defined by the expected game matrix G = E[G t ]. We can relate the algorithms' performance to the minimax value of G.
Lemma
Let τ be some fixed round in the repeated game. For each algorithm ALG j , j ∈ {1, 2}, let A j be its action set, let p t,j ∈ Δ Aj be the distribution chosen in each round t, and letp j = 1 τ t∈[τ ] p t,j be the average play distribution at round τ . Let v * be the minimax value for the expected game
Then for each δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
Eq. (III.5) states that the average play of player 1 is approximately optimal against any distribution chosen by player 2.
8 This lemma is well-known for the deterministic case (i.e., when G t = G for each round t), and folklore for the stochastic case. We provide a proof in Appendix D for the sake of completeness.
IV. A NEW ALGORITHM FOR STOCHASTIC BWK
We present a new algorithm for Stochastic BwK, based on the framework of regret minimization in games. This is a very natural algorithm once the single-shot game is set up, and it allows for a very clean regret analysis. We will also use this algorithm as a subroutine for the adversarial version.
On a high level, we define a stochastic zero-sum game for which a mixed Nash equilibrium corresponds to an optimal solution for a linear relaxation of the original problem. Our algorithm consists of two regret-minimizing algorithms playing this game. The framework of regret minimization in games guarantees that the average primal and dual play distributions (p 1 andp 2 in Lemma III.1) approximate the mixed Nash equilibrium in the expected game, which correspondingly approximates the optimal solution.
A. Linear relaxation and Lagrange functions
We start with a linear relaxation of the problem that all prior work relies on. This relaxation is stated in terms of
We denote this LP by LP M ,B,T . The solution X is the best fixed distribution over actions, according to the relaxation. The value of this LP, denoted OPT LP (M , B, T ), is the expected per-round reward of this distribution. It is also the total reward of X in the relaxation, divided by T . We know from [18] that
where OPT DP and OPT FD are the total expected rewards of, respectively, the best dynamic policy and the best fixed distribution. In words, OPT DP is sandwiched between the total expected reward of the best fixed distribution and that of its linear relaxation. Associated with the linear program 
This property holds for our setting because LP M ,B,T has at least one feasible solution (namely, one that puts probability one on the null action), and the optimal value of the LP is bounded.
Remark IV.1. We use the linear program LP M ,B,T and the associated Lagrange function L M ,B,T throughout the paper. Both are parameterized by an outcome matrix M , budget B and time horizon T . In particular, we can plug in an arbitrary M , and we heavily use this ability throughout. For the adversarial version, it is essential to plug in parameter T 0 ≤ T instead of the time horizon T . For the analysis of the high-probability result in Adversarial BwK, we use a rescaled budget B 0 ≤ B instead of budget B.
B. Our algorithm: repeated Lagrangian game
The Lagrange function L = L M ,B,T from (IV.3) defines the following zero-sum game: the primal player chooses an arm a, the dual player chooses a resource i, and the payoff is a number
The primal player receives this number as a reward, and the dual player receives it as cost. This game is termed the Lagrangian game induced by L M ,B,T . This game will be crucial throughout the paper. The Lagrangian game is related to the original linear program as follows:
Lemma IV.2. Assume one resource is the dummy resource. Consider the linear program LP M ,B,T , for some outcome matrix M . Then the value of this LP equals the minimax value v * of the Lagrangian game induced by L M ,B,T . Further, if (X, λ) is a mixed Nash equilibrium in the Lagrangian game, then X is an optimal solution to the LP.
The proof can be found in Appendix B. The idea is that because of the special structure of the LP, the second equality in (IV.4) also holds when the dual vector λ is restricted to distributions.
Consider a repeated version of the Lagrangian game. Formally, the repeated Lagrangian game with parameters B 0 ≤ B and T 0 ≤ T is a repeated zero-sum game between the primal algorithm that chooses among arms and the dual algorithm that chooses among resources. Each round t of this game is the Lagrangian game induced by the Lagrange function L t := L M t ,B0,T0 , where M t is the round-t outcome matrix. Note that we use parameters B 0 , T 0 instead of budget B and time horizon T . 
(IV.6) Our algorithm, called LagrangeBwK, is very simple: it is a repeated Lagrangian game in which the primal algorithm receives bandit feedback, and the dual algorithm receives full feedback.
To set up the notation, let a t and i t be, respectively, the chosen arm and resource in round t. The payoff is therefore L t (a t , i t ). It can be rewritten in terms of the observed outcome vector o t = (r t ; c t,1 , . . . , c t,d ) (which corresponds to the a t -th row of the instantaneous outcome matrix M t ):
(IV. 
3) The payoff L t (a t , i t ) from (IV.7) is reported to ALG 1 as reward, and to ALG 2 as cost. 4) The payoff L t (a t , i) is reported to ALG 2 for each resource i ∈ [d].
C. Performance guarantees
We consider algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameter T 0 = T . We assume the existence of the dummy resource; this is to ensure that the crucial step, Eq. (IV.13), works out even if the algorithm stops at time T , without exhausting any actual resources. We obtain a regret bound that is non-trivial whenever B > Ω( √ T ), and is optimal, up to log factors, in the regime when min(OPT DP , B) > Ω(T ).
Theorem IV.4. Consider Stochastic BwK with K arms, d resources, time horizon T , and budget B. Assume that one resource is a dummy resource (with deterministic consumption B T for each arm). Fix the failure probability parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). Consider algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameters B 0 = B and T 0 = T . If EXP3.P and Hedge are used as the primal and the dual algorithms, respectively, then the algorithm achieves the following regret bound, with probability at least 1 − δ:
In general, suppose each algorithm ALG j satisfies a regret bound (III.2) with R δ (T ) = R j,δ (T ) and payoff range
Then with probability at least 1 − O(δT ) it holds that
Remark IV.5. To obtain (IV.8) from the "black-box" result (IV.9), we use regret bounds in Eq. (III.4).
Remark IV.6. From [18] , the optimal regret bound for Stochastic BwK is
Thus, the regret bound (IV.8) is near-optimal if min(OPT DP , B) > Ω(T ), and non-trivial if B > Ω( √ T ).
We next prove the "black-box" regret bound (IV.9). For the sake of analysis, consider a version of the repeated Lagrangian game that continues up to the time horizon T . In what follows, we separate the "easy steps" from what we believe is the crux of the proof.
Notation. Let X t be the distribution chosen in round t by the primal algorithm ALG 1 . Let X τ := Using Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. Consider the first τ rounds, for some τ ∈ [T ]. The average reward and resourcei consumption over these rounds are close to X τ · r and X τ · c i , respectively, with high probability. Specifically, a simple usage of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality (Lemma A.1) implies that
hold with probability at least 1 − δ, where
Regret minimization in games. Let us apply the machinery from regret minimization in games to the repeated Lagrangian game. Consider the game matrix G of the expected game. Using Eq. (IV.6) and Lemma IV.2, we conclude that the minimax value of G is v * = OPT LP (M , B, T ). We apply Lemma III.1, with a fixed stopping time τ ∈ [T ].
Recall that the payoff range is b max − b min = T B + 1. Thus, with probability at least 1 − 2δ it holds that
where the regret term is reg(T ) :
Crux of the proof. Let us condition on the event that (IV.10), (IV.11), and (IV.12) hold for each τ ∈ [T ]. By the union bound, this event holds with probability at least 1 − 3δT . Let τ denote the stopping time of the algorithm, the first round when the total consumption of some resource exceeds its budget. Let i be the resource for which this happens; hence,
(IV.13)
Let us use Eq. (IV.12) with λ = λ (i) , the point distribution for this resource. Then by Eq. (IV.6) we have,
By definition of Lagrange function this equals,
Plugging in (IV.10) and (IV.11), this is upper-bounded by
Plugging in Eq. (IV.13), it can further be upper-bounded by,
Plugging this into Eq. (IV.12) and rearranging, we obtain
Since v * ≤ 1 (because v * = OPT LP , as we've proved),
The claimed regret bound (IV.9) follows by Eq. (IV.2), completing the proof of Theorem IV.4. u . Run LagrangeBwK with algorithms ALG 1 , ALG 2 and parameters B 0 = B and T 0 = g/κ.
V. A SIMPLE ALGORITHM FOR ADVERSARIAL BWK
We present and analyze an algorithm for Adversarial BwK which achieves O(d 2 log T ) competitive ratio, in expectation, up to a low-order additive term. Our algorithm is very simple: we randomly guess the value of OPT FD and run LagrangeBwK with parameter T 0 driven by this guess. The analysis is very different, however, since we cannot rely on the machinery from regret minimization in stochastic games. The crux of the analysis (Lemma V.5) is re-used to analyze the high-probability algorithm in the next section.
The intuition for our algorithm can be explained as follows. LagrangeBwK builds on adversarial online learning algorithms ALG j , and appears plausibly applicable to Adversarial BwK. We analyze it for Adversarial BwK, with an arbitrary parameter T 0 (see Lemma V.5, the crux of our analysis), and find that it performs best when T 0 is tailored to OPT FD up to a constant multiplicative factor. This is precisely what our algorithm achieves via the random guess.
Our algorithm is presented as Algorithm 2. We randomly guess the value of OPT FD from within a specified range [g min , g max ], up to the specified multiplicative factor of κ > 0. We consider multiplicative scales [κ u , κ u+1 ], u ∈ N, and we guess uniformly at random among all possible u. Our analysis works as long as OPT FD ∈ [g min , g max ] and κ ≥ d + 1; then we obtain competitive ratio κ 2 log gmax gmin up to a low-order additive term. As a corollary, we obtain competitive ratio κ 2 log T with no assumptions.
Theorem V.1. Consider Adversarial BwK with K arms, d resources, time horizon T , and budget B. Assume that one of the arms is a null arm that has zero reward and zero resource consumption. Consider Algorithm 2 with scale parameter κ ≥ d + 1. Suppose algorithms ALG j that satisfy the regret bound (III.2) with δ = T −2 and regret term
If OPT FD ∈ [g min , g max ] then the expected reward of Algorithm 2 satisfies
where
Remark V.2. One can use algorithms EXP3.P for ALG 1 and Hedge for ALG 2 , with regret bounds given by (III.4), and achieve the regret term reg
. We obtain a meaningful performance guarantee as long as, say, reg < OPT FD /2; this requires OPT FD and B to be at least Ω( √ T K).
Remark V.3. We define the outcome matrices slightly differently compared to Section IV in that we do not posit a dummy resource. Formally, we assume that the null arm has zero consumption in every resource. This is essential for case 1 (i.e., when τ alg ≤ σ) in the analysis of Lemma V.5. Stopped linear program. Let us set up a linear relaxation that is suitable to the adversarial setting. The expected outcome matrix is no longer available. Instead, we use average outcome matrices:
the average up to a given intermediate round τ ∈ [T ]. Similar to the stochastic case, the relaxation assumes that each instantaneous outcome matrix M t is equal to the average outcome matrix M τ . What is different now is that the relaxation depends on τ : using M τ is tantamount to stopping precisely at this round. With this intuition in mind, for a particular end-time τ we consider the linear program (IV.1), parameterized by the time horizon τ and the average outcome matrix M τ . Its value, OPT LP (M τ , B, τ), represents the per-round expected reward, so it needs to be scaled by the factor of τ to obtain the total expected reward. Finally, we maximize over τ . Thus, our linear relaxation for Adversarial BwK is defined as follows:
The inequality in (V.4) is proved in the appendix (Section C).
Regret bounds for ALG j . Since each algorithm ALG j , j ∈ {1, 2} satisfies regret bound (III.2) with δ = T −2 and Let us apply these regret bounds to our setting. Let a t ∈ [K] and i t ∈ [d] be, resp., the chosen arm and resource in round t. We represent the outcomes as vectors over arms: r t , c t,i ∈ [0, 1] K denote, resp., reward vector and resource-i consumption vector for a given round t. Recall that the round-t payoffs in LagrangeBwK are given by the Lagrange function L t := L M t ,B,T0 such that
for each arm a and resource i. Consider the total Lagrangian payoff at a given round τ ∈ [T ]:
is the total reward up to round τ , and
is the consumption term. The regret bounds sandwich (V.6) from above and below: ⎛ ⎝ max
This holds for all τ ∈ [T ], with probability at least 1 − 2δ. The first inequality in (V.7) is due to the primal algorithm, and the second is due to the dual algorithm. Call them primal and dual inequality, respectively.
Crux of the proof. We condition on the event that (V.7) holds for all τ ∈ [T ], which we call the clean event. The crux of the analysis is encapsulated in the following lemma, which analyzes an execution of LagrangeBwK with an arbitrary parameter T 0 under the clean event.
Lemma V.5. Consider an execution of LagrangeBwK with B 0 = B and an arbitrary parameter T 0 such that the clean event holds. Fix an arbitrary round σ ∈ [T ], and consider the LP value relative to this round:
The algorithm's reward up to round σ satisfies
Taking σ to be the maximizer in (V.4), algorithm's reward satisfies
Proof: Let τ alg be the stopping time of the algorithm. We consider two cases, depending on whether some resource is exhausted at time σ. In both cases, we focus on the round min(τ alg , σ).
Case 1: τ alg ≤ σ and some resource is exhausted. Let us focus on round τ = τ alg . If i is the exhausted resource, then t∈[τ ] c t,i (a t ) > B. Let us apply the dual inequality in (V.7) for this resource:
Now, let us apply the primal inequality in (V.7) for the null arm. Recall that the reward and consumption for this arm is 0, so L t (null, i t ) = 1 for each round t. Therefore,
Case 2: τ alg ≥ σ. Let us focus on round σ. Consider the linear program LP M σ ,B,σ , and let X * ∈ Δ K be an optimal solution to this LP. The primal inequality in (V.7) implies
Rearranging and using the fact that t∈[σ] X * ·r t = σ·f (σ) (by optimality of X * ) we get,
Plugging (V.12) into (V.11), we conclude that
Conclusions from the two cases imply (V.10). 
With such a guess g, and provided that κ ≥ d + 1, we have T 0 = g/κ ≥ OPT FD /κ 2 , and
So, by Lemma V.5, the algorithm's execution with this guess, assuming the clean event, satisfies (V.10) with min(T 0 , OPT FD − dT 0 ) ≥ OPT FD /κ 2 and T 0 ≤ OPT FD /κ. The regret term for this guess is 
Let X * be the optimal distribution over the arms. Thus
Note that since c i,t = 0 the only constraint on X * is that it lies in Δ K . Therefore the maximizer is a point distribution on max a∈[K] t∈[T ] r t (a). This proof does not rely on any specific value for B 0 , T 0 . The payoff range is [b max , b min ] = [1, 2] , which implies that
VI. HIGH-PROBABILITY ALGORITHM FOR ADVERSARIAL BWK
We recover the O(log T ) approximation ratio for Adversarial BwK, but with high probability rather than merely in expectation. Our algorithm uses LagrangeBwK as a subroutine, and re-uses the adversarial analysis thereof (Lemma V.5). We do not attempt to optimize the regret term.
The algorithm is considerably more complicated compared to Algorithm 2. Instead of making one random guess g for the value of OPT
[T ]
LP , we iteratively refine this guess over time. The algorithm proceeds in phases. In the beginning of each phase, we start a fresh instance of LagrangeBwK with parameter T 0 defined by the current value of g. 10 We update the guess g in each round (in a way specified later), and stop the phase once g becomes too large compared to its 10 The idea of restarting the algorithm in each phase is similar to the standard "doubling trick" in the online machine learning literature, but much more delicate in our setting. initial value in this phase. We invoke LagrangeBwK with a rescaled budget B 0 = B/Θ (log T ). Within each phase, we simulate the BwK problem with budget B 0 : we stop LagrangeBwK once the consumption of some resource in this phase exceeds B 0 . For the remainder of the phase, we play the null arm with probability 1 − γ 0 and do uniform exploration with the remaining probability, for some parameter γ 0 ∈ (0, 1) (here and elsewhere, uniform exploration refers to choosing each action with equal probability). The pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: High-probability algorithm for Adversarial BwK.
input: scale parameter κ, exploration parameter γ 0 , algorithms ALG 1 , ALG 2 as in Algorithm 1 Initialize g = 1.
for each phase do Start a fresh instance ALG of LagrangeBwK with parameters B 0 = B/2 log κ T and T 0 = g/( log κ T κ 2 ). for each round in this phase do
Recompute the global estimate g if g > T 0 /κ then start a new phase if consumption of all resources in this phase does not exceed B 0 then Play the action chosen by ALG, observe the outcome and report it back to ALG. else Choose the null arm with probability 1 − γ 0 , do uniform exploration otherwise
To complete algorithm's specification, let us define how to update the guess g in each round t. The guess, denoted g t , is an estimate for OPT [t] LP , as defined in (V.4). We form this estimate using a standard inverse propensity scoring (IPS) technique. Let p t and a t be, resp., the distribution and the arm chosen by the primal algorithm in round t. The instantaneous outcome matrix M t is estimated by matrix M ips t
K×d such that each row M ips t (a) is defined as follows:
For a given end-time τ , the average outcome matrix M τ from (V.3) is estimated as
Finally, we plug this estimate into (V.3) and define
For the analysis, we will assume that the primal algorithm does some uniform exploration: 
where the regret term is
Using algorithms EXP3.P for ALG 1 and Hedge for ALG 2 , we can achieve (VI.3) with
This is because EXP3.P, with appropriately modified uniform exploration term γ = T −1/4 , satisfies the regret bound
, and for Hedge we can (still) use Eq. (III.4). The theorem is meaningful whenever, say, reg < OPT FD /2. The latter requires
Remark VI.3. Like in Theorem V.1, we posit that the null arm does not consume any resources.
We provide a proof sketch below. The detailed proof, quite lengthy and technical, can be found in the full version [53] .
Proof Sketch: The proof consists of several steps. First, we argue that the guess g t is close to OPT
LP with high probability. This argument only relies on the uniform exploration property (VI.1) and the definition of IPS estimators, not on any properties of the algorithm. We immediately obtain concentration for the average outcome matrices; a somewhat subtle point is to derive concentration on the respective LP-values.
Next, we focus on a particular phase in the execution of the algorithm. We say that a phase is full if the stopping condition g t > T 0 /κ has fired. We focus on the last full phase. We prove there is enough reward to be collected in this phase. Essentially, letting τ 1 , τ 2 be, resp., the start and end time of this phase, we consider the BwK problem restricted to time interval [τ 1 , τ 2 ], and lower-bound the LPvalue of this problem in terms of the LP-value of the original problem. Finally, we use the adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK (Lemma V.5) to guarantee that our algorithm actually collects that value.
Because of the stopping condition g t > T 0 /κ, there can be at most log κ T phases. Therefore, rescaling the budget to B 0 /2 log κ T guarantees that the algorithm consumes at most B/2 of the budget. We then argue that, with highprobability, the additional uniform exploration in each phase, consumes a budget of at most B/2 with high-probability. Thus, the algorithm never runs out of budget.
VII. LOWER BOUNDS
We provide the theorem statements and the constructions for the lower bounds on the competitive ratio that we have claimed in Section I: the Ω(log T ) lower bound w.r.t. the best fixed distribution benchmark (OPT FD ), the Ω(T ) lower bound w.r.t. the best dynamic policy benchmark (OPT DP ), and the Ω(K) lower bound w.r.t. the best fixed arm benchmark (OPT FA ). All lower-bounds are for a randomized algorithm against an oblivious adversary. The proofs are deferred to the full version [53] . Remark VII.2. The lower bounds for parts (a,b,c) hold (even) for problem instances with K = 2 arms. The lower bounds in parts (a,b) hold even for a much more permissive feedback model from the online packing literature, namely, when the algorithm observes the outcome vector for all actions in a given round, and moreover does it before it chooses an arm in this round.
The constructions (for the respective parts of the theorem) are as follows: (a) There are two arms and one resource with budget B = T 2 . Arm 1 has zero rewards and zero consumption. Arm 2 has consumption 1 in each round, and offers reward The intuition is that given a random instance as input the algorithm needs to choose how much budget to invest in the first half-time, without knowing what comes in the second, and any choice (in expectation) leads to the claimed competitive ratio. (b) There is one resource with budget B, and two arms, denoted A 0 , A 1 . Arm A 0 is the "null arm" that has zero reward and zero consumption. The consumption of arm A 1 is 1 in all rounds. The rewards of A 1 are defined as follows. We partition the time into T B phases of duration B each (for simplicity, assume that B divides T ). We consider 
VIII. OPEN QUESTIONS
We use essentially the same algorithm, LagrangeBwK, to solve both stochastic and adversarial version of bandits with knapsacks. Yet, we use it with different parameter T 0 and a slightly different definition of the outcome matrices. Indeed, recall that in the stochastic setting there a 'dummy resource' with strictly positive consumption for all arms, whereas in the adversarial version the null arm must have zero consumption for all resources. Can we solve both versions with exactly the same algorithm? One concrete goal would be to achieve O(log T ) competitive ratio in the adversarial version, and o(T ) regret for the stochastic version in the regime min(B, OPT FD ) ≥ Ω(T ). A similar "best of both worlds" result has been obtained for bandits without budget/supply constraints: one algorithm that achieves optimal regret rates for both adversarial bandits and stochastic bandits, without knowing which environment it is in [27, 78, 13] . Further developments focused on mostly stochastic environments with a small amount of adversarial behavior [78, 77, 61, 87] ; similar questions are relevant to BwK as well, once the basic "best-of-both-worlds" question is resolved.
